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AN ATTORNEY IS NOT A ROLLS-ROYCE: THE COMPREHENSIVE
FORFEITURE ACT OF 1984 AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AFTER UNITED STATES v.
MONSANTO

I.

INTRODUCTION. THE COMPREHENSIVE FORFEITURE ACT OF
A HASTY RESPONSE TO PERSISTENT PROBLEMS

1984:

The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (CFA)' was intended to act as a doomsday
weapon against organized criminal syndicates2 and upper-level drug dealers, by permitting
the Government to seize all illegally obtained assets from individuals convicted under
Racketeer Influenced Criminal Organization (RICO)3 or Continuing Criminal Enterprise
(CCE) 4 and, eventually, to use those funds for further enforcement efforts. Forfeiture
provisions are essential to law enforcement efforts against enterprise criminality, and the
CFA as drafted presents no particular constitutional problem. However, as construed by
United States v. Monsanto5 and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,6 the
CFA is so broad as to deprive criminal defendants of core constitutional safeguards.
Although the CFA contains.several provisions that are repugnant to the defense
bar, the Act is more disturbing for what it does not contain than for what it does. On its
face, the CFA makes all asset transfers between a suspect and a third party subject to
forfeiture if the assets can be traced to an illegal source. No language in the CFA makes
the transfer provisions more specific; consequently, whether attorneys' fees fall within the
ambit of the Act cannot be discerned from any explicit language. 7 The scant legislative
history of the statute is silent'on the subject of attorneys' fees, and judicial attempts at

18 U.S.C. § 1963; 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1984).
2 The term "organized crime" means something specific. For example, one representative organized
crime syndicate is "the Columbo Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra[,] ... a professional criminal
organization which was one of the New York City constituent units of the American Mafia." Brief for the
United States of America at 19, United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1022 (1988). Operating "since at least the 1960s," the Columbo family is "a ruthless and enormously
successful criminal business." Id. at 9. The Columbo Family operates "in New York City and other places
around the country," id., such as Florida and Las Vegas, id. at 10, and engages "in almost every imaginable
sort of criminal conduct, from loansharking to dealing in narcotics to extortion to labor racketeering to theft
to bribery." Id. at 9. The crimes run the gamut from "murder to vandalism." Id. The Columbo Family
dominated at least eight different labor unions in New York City. Mafia Families have a "well defined
organizational structure: A Boss, assisted by the Underboss and advised by the Consigliere, [leads] the
Family. Below these three leaders [are] the Capos or captains, trusted and powerful officers, each of whom
was in command of a 'crew' of 'soldiers.' The soldiers, often called 'made' men, were formally initiated
members of the Family and of La Cosa Nostra ....
To be eligible for initiation, a candidate was required
to be Italian by ethnic background. The soldiers, in turn, presided over crews of their own, which were
comprised of 'associates,' criminal colleagues who either were ineligible for, uninterested in, or still
anticipating formal induction into the Mafia." Id. at 10-11. The information about the Columbo family was
obtained through recorded conversations, testimony of former members and of victims, and surveillance
photographs. Id. at 10. The defendants in United States v. Persico did not contest the existence of their
organization. Id.
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1968 (1988).
4 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
5 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
6 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
7 "In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language." United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
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interpretation split the circuits.' In United States v. Monsanto, the Supreme Court
resolved the split by ruling that no asset transfers are preferred under the Act, regardless
of the class of the recipient or the purpose of the transfer.9
This discussion explores the constitutional and ethical implications of the
Monsanto decision as it relates to the CFA. Although the Court relied on legislative
silence to conclude that attorneys' fees are forfeitable, legislative silence should not be
interpreted as permitting forfeiture of those fees. First, legislative silence was an oversight
that resulted from the political climate at the time of the CFA's drafting and cannot be
regarded as demonstrative of legislative intent to encompass attorneys's fees within the
terms of the CFA. Second, permitting forfeiture of attorneys' fees constitutes a direct0
violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistence of counsel,
and is inconsistent with the constitutionality of the CFA. Furthermore, such a reading not
only countermands the holdings of most of the circuit courts," but also undermines
ancient values which form the bedrock of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. These
values include a tradition of hostility to criminal forfeitures and a policy of lenity in the
case of ambiguous criminal statutes.
II.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE FORFEITURE ACT

A. Political Background and Legislative Purpose
The CFA was passed when drug violence and the increasing power of
professional criminal organizations were sharing national attention with shrinking domestic
resources. Discussion of these issues was fed by the hot breeze of an approaching
election. The resultant political climate of fear, frustration, and hysteria generated the
CFA 2 and contributed to the sparsity of significant (recorded) legislative deliberation.

8

See, e.g., In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988)

(en banc), affd, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd on reh'g,
877 F.2d 341 (1989); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Nichols,
841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988).
9 Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
to That constitutional guarantee comes from the Sixth Amendment and it has two parts. The first part
provides that a criminal defendant has the right to an attorney. But the guarantee goes one step further: the
second part provides that the assistance of counsel must be effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (the guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel does not extend if the defendant is only to be fined).
II See infra note 25.
12 The CFA was passed as part of the sprawling Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.
Continuing Appropriations, 1985 -- Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984; Joint Resolution Making
Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1985, and for Other Purposes. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1976 - 2194. The Act covers bail (98 Stat. 1976), pretrial detention (98 Stat. 1985),
sentencing reform (98 Stat. 1987), postsentence administration (98 Stat. 2001), miscellaneous sentencing
provisions (98 Stat. 2010), establishment of the United States Sentencing Commission (98 Stat. 2017), fines
(98 Stat. 2034), offenders with mental disease or defect (98 Stat. 2057), drug enforcement amendments (98
Stat. 2068), justice assistance (98 Stat. 2077), amendments to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974 (98 Stat. 2107), surplus federal property used in corrections (98 Stat. 2129), labor
racketeering amendments (98 Stat. 2131), Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act Amendments
(98 Stat. 2135), miscellaneous violent crime amendments (98 Stat. 2136), serious nonviolent offenses (98
Stat. 2143), procedural amendments (98 Stat. 2149), protection of witnesses (98 Stat. 2153), victim
compensation and assistance (98 Stat. 2170), forfeiture of collateral profits of crime (98 Stat. 2175),
trademark counterfeiting (98 Stat. 2178), credit card fraud (98 Stat. 2183), salaries of United States attorneys
(98 Stat. 2184), armed career criminal and Criminal Justice Act revision (98 Stat. 2185), terrorism (98 Stat.
2186), and access devices and computers (98 Stat. 2190). The Act was intended to respond to "violent
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Some form of a CFA is essential, and despite the hysteria in the delivery room,
the CFA is a legitimate child. Experience has shown that traditional enforcement methods
and sanctions have had minimal impact on CCE and RICO organizations, demonstrating
a need for the CFA: "The drug trafficking laws produce unique problems at the postconviction stage because the huge profits 3 resulting from these enterprises tend to
dampen the prospects for general deterrence or rehabilitation." 4 Racketeering enterprises,
like drug traffickers unassociated with organized crime, regard fines and jail sentences as
just another cost of doing business." Furthermore, jailed members of organized crime
families are typically capable of running their organizations from prison 6 by using their
virtually limitless financial resources to corrupt the necessary government officials. 7 The
CFA broadened the scope of RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions in order to provide a
more potent mechanism by which the Government could seize "all 'proceeds' of narcotics
trafficking" and racketeering activity" and "begin hitting the criminal element where it
really hurts - in the pocketbook."' 9
The rationale behind the CFA was that "the conviction of individual racketeers
and drug dealers would be of only limited effectiveness if the economic power bases of
criminal organizations or enterprises were left intact."2 Consequently, the CFA contains
controversial provisions that (1) vest title in the Government to all proceeds 2' that are
the direct or indirect fruits of criminal conduct,22 (2) void the legitimacy of transfers by
defendants of illegally obtained assets, and (3) allow the Government to move for pre-trial
or even pre-indictment freezing of defendants' assets. As a result of these drastic

crime, drug-related crime, and organized crime." Hearings before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (May 4, 11,18, 19, and 23, 1983)
(opening statement of Sen. Paul Laxalt, Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Law).
13 "Estimates indicate that over 700 lawful United States businesses have been infiltrated by organized
crime. In Florida alone estimated real estate investments resulting from narcotics trafficking totalled $1
billion in 1977 and 1978." William J. Hughes & Edward H. O'Connell, Jr., In Personam (Criminal)
Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition into a Modern
Dilemma, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 613, 615 (1984). The infamous "Black Tuna" drug-smuggling organization
successfully imported into the United States over "one million pounds of marijuana," United States v.
Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 985 (5th Cir. 1981), with gross receipts "calculated at a minimum of $220 million
[dollars] over a year and a half ....[Tihe evidence showed that numerous bank deposits going as high as
one-half million dollars were made." Hughes & O'Connell, supra, at 616-17.
'4 Hughes & O'Connell, supra note 13, at
613.
15 The CFA is necessary because "[tlhe profits or proceeds which flow directly from criminal conduct
should not continue to be available for criminal enterprises." Forfeiture in Drug Cases: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives on H.R. 2646, H.R. 4110, and
H.R. 5371, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 2 (September 16, 1981 and March 9, 1982) [hereinafter Hearings].
16 See, e.g., Brief for the United States of America at 5, United States v. Persico, 620 F. Supp. 836
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985) (No. 89-1204).
See, e.g., Persico bief (No. 86-1468), supra note 2, at 90-104, and Persico brief (No. 89-1204),
supra note 16, at 3.
18 Hearings, supra note 15, at 26.
!9 Id. at 29.
20 General Statement and Summary, Title 111-Forfeiture, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N., (98
Stat.) 3374.
21 The CFA defines "proceeds" as "Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section
includ[ing] - (1)real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land; and (2) tangible
and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities." 21 U.S.C. §
853(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b).
22 Specifically, as enumerated in 21 U.S.C. § 848 and 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
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provisions, the "Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984... will continue to result in many
thorny legal issues to be considered by the courts.' 23
Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court further confuse the impenetrable
thicket of unintended results of the CFA. In Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale, the Court
held that it was neither unconstitutional nor contrary to Congressional intent for the
Government to freeze the assets of a criminal defendant prior to trial even if he intends
to use those fees to pay his defense attorney.24 Notably, the Court's holdings overruled
those of the majority of the federal courts.25
B. The Language of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act
The CFA was codified in 1984 amendments to CCE26, and RICO.27 The two
provisions are the same and are construed identically.2 8 Specifically, the CFA provides
that "[a]ll right, title, and interest in property ... vests in the United States upon the
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. '"2 Not only does the
CFA contain that relation-back provision, but CFA also provides:
Any [forfeitable] property that is subsequently transferred to a person
other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of
forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States,
unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (1)
[or, in the case of § 853, subsection (n) of this section] that he is a bona
fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase

23
24

United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,

491 U.S. 617 (1989).
25 Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to
Define Individual ConstitutionalRights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1987). See also id. at 33 n.154
Research for this Article uncovered a number of published opinions and unpublished
orders in which courts have ruled upon fee forfeiture issues raised by the 1984 CFA
amendments. All but one prohibited fee forfeitures, either holding that they violate the
sixth amendment or construing the statutes to exempt these fees, in order to preserve
the statutes from constitutional challenge. See [United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905
(4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis. 1986), affd sub
nora. Fontanez v. United States, 876 F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.
lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also United States v. Bassett, 632 F.
Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va.
1986); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States
v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Sobczak, S-Cr. 8500033 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 6, 1985); United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453 (W.D.
Pa. 1986); United States v. Marx, No. 86-Cr-110 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 6, 1986)].
Id.
26
27
28

21 U.S.C. §§ 848-858.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
"18 U.S.C. § 1963 is the RICO forfeiture provision which was included in the Comprehensive

Forfeiture Act of 1984 and is a mirror of 21 U.S.C. § 853. The cases discussing forfeiture of attorneys' fees
under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 are therefore fully applicable to forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 853." United States v.
Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 n.2 (ED. Va. 1986). See also United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp.
at 1347 (noting that in personam forfeiture provisions of RICO and the drug enforcement statute are almost
identical).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).
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was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject
to forfeiture under this section."
The hearing provision mandates that, in order to defeat the forfeiture action, the third
party must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legal interest in the property
was superior to the defendant's interest upon commission of acts3' or that "the petitioner
is a bona fide purchaser ...and was at the time of purchase reasonably without cause to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section."3 Note that the
third party has the burden of proving the legitimacy of the transfer. The Government need
not prove the forfeitability of the asset.
The Government's burden is minimal.33 In fact, the most controversial section
of the CFA subjects an individual's assets to freezing upon or even before the filing of
an indictment or information against him if the Government fears that a defendant's assets
might be dissipated.34 However, in this instance, the Government's burden is slightly
higher: "Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or
injunction ... or take any other action to preserve the availability of property described
in subsection (a) [of both sections] for forfeiture under this section" upon "the filing of
an indictment or information" as long as the Government meets its burden of proving that,
upon conviction of violating RICO or CCE, defendant's assets that were derived from his
drug-related offenses would be subject to forfeiture under the relevant sections of CFA.35

III.

INTERPRETING THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE GIVEN THE SPARSE
LESISLATIVE HISTORY WITH WHICH TO ESTABLISH INTENT

A. An Interpretationof the Language of the CFA
The courts have developed rules for determining what statutes mean,36 looking
first to the language of the statute.37 Should inspection of the plain language fail to
resolve any "omission or ambiguity on the face of the statute, [the court] turn[s] to the
legislative history."3 Moreover, courts must construe criminal statutes narrowly, in favor
of the defendant: "[A]mbiguities in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of

30

18 U.S.C. § 1963(c); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).

31 18 U.S.C. § 1863(l)(6); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6).
32 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).
33 In order to freeze the assets of defendant prior to trial, the Government must make a motion to the
Court "alleging that the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction,
be subject to forfeiture under this section." 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (d)(l)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (e)(1)(A).
34 To meet its burden and freeze the assets of a defendant prior to the issuance of an indictment, the
Government must prove that "there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the issue
of forfeiture and that failure to enter the [protective] order [freezing defendant's assets prior to the issuance
of the indictment] will result" in dissipation of the assets and that "the need to preserve" the assets
"outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered." 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(d)(1)(B)(i) and (ii); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (e)(1)(B)(i) and (ii).
35 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e).
36 United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
37 Id. at 1339.
38 Id. (citing Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 745 (10th Cir. 1982); United

States v.Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)).
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lenity."39 Finally, "the statute should be interpreted to avoid requiring unnecessary
analysis of constitutional issues."40
While the CFA does not specify how attorneys' fees should be handled and the
legislative history is limited, the record does contain explicit statements that the purpose
of the CFA was to take the profit out of crime.4 For example, the Subcommittee on
Crime indicated that it intended to "[d]evelop a piece of legislation which embodies the
best of [the CFA's intended purposes] without doing violence to due process or other
'
constitutional rights of defendants or innocent third parties."42
The third-party provisions were designed "[t]o permit forfeiture of a narcotics
trafficker's assets even if he puts his illegal profits beyond the reach of domestic law
enforcement."43 Specifically, "the laundering of profits and proceeds to foreign
depositories and through multiple front corporations was a major complaint of Federal
investigators to members of the Narcotics Committee Staff,"" and so the bill was
intended to extend the reach of RICO and CCE "to illegal gains that are transferred to
third parties."4 5 These concerns about money-laundering were echoed by the General
Accounting Office (GAO).46
In light of the stated concerns of the sponsors of the bill, the committee members
in the House, and officials of the executive branch, the legislative intent of the CFA with
regard to attorneys' fees is plain. The record is full of affirmative expressions of
legislative intent to prevent otherwise forfeitable assets from being subjected to sham
transfers that put the funds out of the reach of the Government, but the neglect of the
drafters of the CFA to put the words "attorneys' fees" somewhere in the record has caused
considerable perplexity in the courts.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Legislative Silence.
The circuit split was resolved during the Supreme Court's October 1988 term in
United States v. Monsanto47 and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States.48 In
Monsanto, a criminal defendant raised a challenge to the CFA under two theories. First,
Monsanto alleged that assets used to pay an attorney did not fall within the ambit of CFA.
Second, Monsanto asserted that even if CFA did apply to attorneys' fees, the pretrial
freezing of assets earmarked for attorneys' fees was unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause and under the Sixth Amendment right 49 to counsel of

39 Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 686 F.2d 850, 853 (10th Cir. 1982); Bifulco v. United States,

447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)). See also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
40 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1339 (citing Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193
(1909)).
41 "[F]undamental principles need to be kept in mind.... First, the profits or proceeds which flow
directly from criminal conduct should not continue to be available for criminal enterprises." Hearings,supra
note 14, at 2.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 26.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 38.
47 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
48 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
49

See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
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one's choice. 50 The Monsanto opinion focused on statutory analysis and only skirted the
thicket of constitutional issues growing from the prospect of forfeiture of attorneys' fees.
On the same day, the Court untangled (and then dismissed) those issues in Caplin &
Drysdale.5
The Court in Monsanto noted the Supreme Court tradition of construing statutes
so as to avoid constitutional issues.52 Nevertheless, the Court ignored a fair reading of
the CFA that would avoid constitutional issues and instead held that the CFA
unambiguously reached attorneys' fees, noting that the purpose of CFA was to preserve
the availability of property for forfeiture. 3 The Court dismissed the Fourth Amendment
Due Process concerns, stating that "it would be odd to conclude that the Government may
not restrain property ... based on a finding of probable cause, when we have held that
(under appropriate circumstances), the Government may restrain persons where there is
a finding of probable cause to believe that the accused has committed a serious
offense."54
Nevertheless, the majority of federal courts declined to allow the forfeiture of
assets intended to pay defense attorneys for services rendered in criminal proceedings
because they perceived untenable constitutional and ethical consequences from such a
reading. These courts construed the forfeiture amendments as follows:
[The amendments apply to third-party transfers] only
to claim property included in schemes designed to
frustrate law enforcement. As a result, these courts
have generally agreed that "it is evident that bona fide
attorney's fees paid to defense counsel ... were not
intended to be forfeitable by Congress, for it cannot

50 Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 604, 614.
51 [T]he majority pauses hardly long enough to acknowledge "the Sixth Amendment's
protection of one's right to retain counsel of his choosing," let alone to explore its "full
extent." Instead, it moves rapidly from the observation that "a defendant may not
insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford," to the conclusion that the
Government is free to deem the defendant indigent by declaring his assets "tainted" by
criminal activity the Government has yet to prove.
Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 643 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
52 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979).
53 Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 609 n.8.
54 Id. at 616 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)). The Court's analysis here is a bit
specious. Any court-imposed restrictions upon a criminal defendant prior to trial are reflections of the
court's assessment of the defendant's innocence and present disruptions of the defendant's life; however, the
difference between Salerno detentions and Monsanto asset seizures is greater than the obvious distinction
between a human being and his property. They go to the nature of the available substantive and procedural
safeguards, the degree of harm to the defendant, the availability of alternative measures to effectuate the
Government's purpose, and the remedies available to a wronged defendant.
[Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (f), defendant] may request the presence of counsel at
the detention hearing, he may testify and present witnesses on his behalf, as well as
proffer evidence, and he may cross-examine other witnesses appearing at the hearing.
If the judicial officer finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably assure
the safety of other persons and the community, he must state his findings of fact in
writing § 3142; and support his conclusion with "clear and convincing evidence," §
3142 (f).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742.
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be said that such fees were paid as part of an artifice
or sham to avoid forfeiture."55
Other courts, however, reasoned that assets intended to pay attorneys' fees were no
different than any other kind of assets and hence were forfeitable under CFA: "The clear
terms of the statute subject a defendant's assets to forfeiture without regard to whether he
intends to use them to pay an attorney."56
When interpreting the CFA, a court's ruling on whether assets earmarked to pay
the fees of a defense attorney are forfeitable usually hinges on whether the court adheres
to the fiction that the payment of attorneys' fees is no different from any other kind of
asset transfer. For example, in United States v. Payden57 , Judge Edelstein argued that if
the CFA was intended to prevent the racketeer from obtaining "a Rolls-Royce with the
fruits of a crime, he cannot be permitted to obtain the services of the Rolls-Royce of
attorneys from these same tainted funds."58 Similarly, the Court in Monsanto
acknowledged respondent's contention:
[T]he legislative history is "silent" on this question,
and ... the House and Senate debates fail to discuss
this prospect.59 But this proves nothing: the
legislative history and congressional debates are
similarly silent on the use of forfeitable assets to pay
stockbroker's fees, laundry bills, or country club
memberships; no one could credibly argue that, as a
result, assets to be used for these purposes are
similarly exempt from the statute's definition of
forfeitable property. The fact that the forfeiture
provision reaches assets that could be used to pay
attorney's fees, even though it contains no express
provisions to this effect, "'does not demonstrate
ambiguity"' in the statute: "'It demonstrates
breadth."'"
Those who argue that attorneys' fees do not fall within the ambit of the CFA
contend that the Monsanto reading violates "a fundamental principle of statutory
interpretation that in deciding among possible interpretations of a statute, the court must
select an interpretation that appears to be consistent with the constitutionality of the
statute.''61 These opponents of the Court's ruling argue that the contested reading results
in an application of the CFA that "chills the attorney-client relationship, deprives the

55 Cloud, supra note 25, at 29. (quoting United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 455-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
56 In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 1988),

affd 491 U.S. 617 (1989).

" 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1985).
58

Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14.

59 I.e., forfeiture of attorneys' fees.
60 United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 608-09 (1989) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473

U.S. 479, 499, (1985) (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384,
398 (7th Cir. 1984))).
61 United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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accused of counsel of their choice, and forces RICO defendants to operate without a
lawyer at the early stages of an investigation - all in derogation of the Sixth
' 63
62
Amendment right to counsel. '
On the other hand, proponents of the Court's decision in Monsanto, such as
Professor Kathleen Brickey, argue that, "While this right-to-counsel claim may appeal to
64
some innate sense of fairness, as a constitutional challenge it is seriously flawed.",
Brickey analogizes the efforts of a RICO defendant to pay his attorney with tainted assets
to those of a bank robber who attempts to pay his attorney with bait money stained red,
and characterizes both transfers as money-laundering. 65 "Simply put, neither the client's
[S]ixth Amendment right to counsel nor the attorney's privilege to practice law confers
a license to' steal. "66 Furthermore, "claims of ineffective lawyering are generally
adjudicated after the attorney has had an opportunity to represent the client, not
before. ,67
A common concern among law-enforcement agencies is that defense counsel in
RICO actions are so close to the organized crime families that they themselves are de
facto members. Hence, some policymakers favor forfeiture provisions not because they
think that transactions between attorney and client are indistinguishable from all other
transactions, but because they are convinced that the attorneys in RICO and CCE actions
are frequently indistinguishable from the defendants. However, a reading of the CFA that
did not include bona fide attorneys' fees within its ambit, would still permit the
invalidation of sham transfers between a defendant and his attorney; consequently, the
CFA would be effective against "mouthpieces" when their representation was just an
excuse to sequester assets for the defendants. The natural next step is a formulation of a
standard for determining when attorneys' fees are bona fide.
Meanwhile, an analysis favoring forfeiture of bona fide attorneys' fees is
"constitutionally inadequate because it fails to accommodate or protect Sixth Amendment
interests during critical'pretrial stages of a prosecution when they are most significant. "68
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches "during perhaps the most critical period
of the proceedings[,] ... from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their
trial, when consultation, thorough investigation and preparation [are] vitally important, the
defendants [are] . .'. as much entitled to such aid ... as at the trial itself. '69 "Attempting
to adjudicate defendant's Sixth Amendment claims after trial 'may affect the outcome of
individual defendants' cases in ways that escape meaningful later review. ' ' 7
Even if remedies for Sixth Amendment'violations could somehow be guaranteed,
advocates of attorney-fee forfeiture miss the point - assets destined to pay bona fide
attorneys' fees are different from other assets. The difference is that the relationship

62

The relevant portion of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: "In

all criminal prosecutions, the accused.shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
63 Kathleen F. Brickey, This Right-to-Counsel Claim Is Illusory, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 1989, at 23.
64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

"To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, the defendant must show both deficient performance

and prejudicial effect. Those issues cannot be resolved before the trial." Id.
68 Cloud, supra note 25, at 41.
69

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).

"And to assess the impact of a conflict of interest on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in
plea negotiations would be virtually impossible." Cloud, supra note 25, at 41. See also Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491 (1978).
70
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between a criminal defense attorney and his client is afforded constitutional protections
which are substantially eroded by the CFA's potential impact on the transactions between
the parties.
Practically speaking, the relationship between an attorney and a client is not
comparable to that between a consumer and a Rolls-Royce salesman; the relationship is
more analogous to that between a physician and his patient. 7' (Indeed, the CFA has been
interpreted to provide an exception for "necessities in life. 72) Imagine, in that context,
a situation wherein a physician reasonably fears that his fee might be subject to
confiscation, or that he might trigger the operation of certain regulations that would force
him to report certain illnesses to his patient's employer. We would be outraged if
physicians could no longer adequately care for grievously ill patients because they
legitimately feared that they might not be compensated, or if they discouraged such
patients from choosing certain kinds of treatments so that costs might be kept down, or
if patients could no longer communicate enough about their conditions for doctors to make
accurate diagnoses because of legitimate fears that the disclosures might be available to
third parties.73 If our Rolls-Royce salesman complained of forced disclosures we would
be nonplussed, but physicians who attempted to defend their financially motivated
responses to a CFA-like provision would be accused of preserving their bankrolls at the
expense of providing good care.
In United States v. Ianiello,74 Judge Motley observed that § 1963 on its face
"refers only to property or assets transferred to third parties in general" and noted that
"[the scant legislative history is devoid of any explicit reference as to whether or not
attorneys' fees are forfeitable."75 Judge Motley pointed out that what legislative history
exits, however, makes it clear that the third-party provisions in the CFA were intended
to prevent sham transfers or money laundering:
[T]he Senate Report states that "[t]he provision [i.e.,
§ 1963(m)] should be construed to deny relief to third
parties acting as nominees of the defendant or who
have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent
transactions. The standard for relief reflects the

71 Some may argue that the analogy is flawed because the patient has incurred no moral culpability,

whereas the client is at least suspected of moral culpability. However, it can be seen that moral culpability
often can be attached to a medical patient with more certainty than to a criminal defendant: Some of the
worst diseases are caused or exacerbated by the conduct of the sufferer, whereas the moral culpability of a
criminal defendant cannot be determined until the jury comes back. In the meantime, when encountered by
a lung cancer patient who is a two-pack-a-day smoker or a heart attack victim who loves fried food, few are
prepared to put those patients on a kind of "moral culpability scale" and then prescribe "permissible" levels
of suffering based upon that scale. We should be just as reluctant to prescribe "permissible" levels of abuse
allowed upon a criminal defendant - especially where, as here, the challenged conduct affects the outcome
of the very proceeding that is to determine the existence of moral culpability. The analogy is sound.
72 An attorney is a "necessity in life." United States v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 459 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
7 Actually, regarding a situation wherein the physician might be required to disclose details of his
patient's condition to a third party, the analogy is not precise, because a prosecutor's office does not
correspond to the HMO, it corresponds to the disease.
74 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 455 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988)). Judge Motley also points out
that the post-conviction hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) also makes no mention of attorneys' fees.
Id.
75 Id.
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principles concerning voiding of transfers set76 out in
18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) as amended by the Bill.
The court focused, therefore, on the nature of the transaction between attorney and client,
and concluded that "it is evident that bona fide attorneys' fees paid to defense counsel
who serve the defendant's needs within our adversary system were not intended to be
forfeitable by Congress, for it cannot be said that such fees were paid as part of an
artifice or sham to avoid forfeiture."77
IV.

REGARDLESS OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT, PERMITTING FORFEITURE OF ATORNEY'S

FEES
PURSUANT TO THE COMPREHENSIVE FORFEITURE ACT DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY
CONSTITUTES
A VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL

A. Statutory Construction and the Sixth Amendment
Because of the epidemic of silence in the CFA itself and in its legislative history
regarding whose services fall within its ambit, an interpretation of the CFA permitting
forfeiture of assets intended to pay defense attorneys would not be facially impossible. On
the other hand, such a reading would be inconsistent with what legislative intent does
exist in the record and with the judicial rule that statutes must be read so as to be
constitutional.78
The CFA threatens a constitutional safeguard that forms the bedrock for our
adversary criminal justice system - the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.79 The
attorney-client relationship is accorded such deference in this context that the Supreme
Court has held that the Sixth Amendment gives a qualified 8' right to counsel of the
defendant's choice.8' The right to effective assistance of counsel and of counsel of one's
choice are given high degrees of protection: "[C]ourts should scrutinize infringements on
[the right to counsel of choice], permitting interference"8 2 only for "a compelling need
to assure the 'prompt, effective and efficient administration of justice.' '"83 Meanwhile,
the only governmental interest articulated in favor of forfeiture of assets intended to be
transferred to third parties is in the deterrence of sham transfers.84

76

Id. (citing S.REP. No. 473, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 209 n. 47 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.

3182, 3392).
77 Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added).
78 See id. at 456.
79 Id. at 456 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932)); United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d

1140, 1149 (2d Cir. 1980). The right to obtain assistance of counsel at all crucial stages is essential if both
the symbol and reality of a fair trial are to be preserved. Id. (emphasis added).
80 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena served upon John Doe, Esq., 759 F.2d 968,
972 (2d Cir.
1985), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1075
(3d Cir. 1982); Davis v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477, 479 (3d Cir. 1981).
81 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 456 (citing United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979)).
82 Thomas C. Viles, Criminal Procedure IV: Attorney's Fees Forfeiture and Subpoenaing Defendants' Attorneys, I ANN. SURV. AM. L. 335, 345 (1986).
83 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 456 (quoting United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1069 (1979)).
84 Viles, supra note 81, at-345.
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The CFA was judicially interpreted for the first time in United States v.
Rogers.85 The Court ruled that "attorneys' fees received 'in return for services
legitimately rendered' are transferred at 'arm's length,' and therefore of no interest to the
government under the CFA."86 Thus, freezing a defendant's assets when he intends to
use them to pay bona fide attorneys' fees is patently unreasonable. "Statutory procedures
or prosecutorial power also are not permitted to unreasonably abridge the right to counsel
of choice. It is evident that the forfeiture of attorneys' fees would impinge upon
defendant's right to counsel of choice."87
In addition to the risk of losing their fees, 8 attorneys face numerous and severe
ethical impediments, which are discussed below. These obstacles could make attorneys
reluctant to take a defendant's case, infringing on a defendant's right to counsel. The right
to counsel of choice "is of constitutional dimensions. Thus, any potential infringement of
this right must only be as a last resort."89
On the other hand, counsel of choice is available only if a defendant can afford
him. Proponents of permitting the forfeiture of attorneys' fees under the CFA argue that
a RICO defendant whose assets are frozen or forfeited under the CFA cannot afford to
pick his counsel because the illegally obtained assets do not belong to the defendant in
the first place.9" He isin the same position as the indigent defendant. Just as an indigent
defendant could not rob a bank and then pay his attorney with the money, a RICO or
CCE defendant should not be permitted to sell drugs or commit extortion and then use
that money to pay for his attorney's services.
But the two situations contain important differences. First, the problem in a RICO
or CCE forfeiture action is in the separation of illicitly obtained funds from legitimate
funds, and the fact that frequently the assets have become several times removed from
their allegedly illegal sources. If the money is stained red we know it belongs to the bank,
but otherwise, fungible assets are nonpossessory on their face. Furthermore, a defendant
is not entitled to retain the Rolls-Royce of the criminal defense bar if the defendant lacks
the necessary assets. However, the wealthy RICO or CCE defendant facing a CFA

85 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
86

Viles, supra note 81, at 345 (quoting United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348-49 (D.

Colo. 1985)).
87 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 456 (emphasis added).
88 Considering the fact that RICO cases are often very complex and can last for several years, the fees
generated in such cases are bound to be quite high. Viles, supra note 81, at 342 n.53.
89 In re Grand Jury Subpoena served upon John Doe, Esq., 759 F.2d 968, 975 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1986). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
90 Supporting this interpretation is the equitable doctrine of constructive trust.
Equitable notions of constructive trust will nullify transfers designed as an artifice or
sham. As explained in Am. Jur.:
A constructive trust ... is a trust by operation of law which
arises contrary to intention and in invitum against one whom, by
fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence,
by commission or wrong, or by any form of unconscionable
conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in
any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained
or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity
and good conscience, hold and enjoy.
United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1342 (quoting 76 AM. JUR. 2d TRUSTS § 221 (1975)). On the
other hand, this analogy applies only to sham transfers. It makes no mention of illegally obtained asets.
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forfeiture proceeding lacks the funds to retain the counsel of his choice because of the
Government's efforts. 9'
Such efforts, given the necessary judicial deference accorded the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, 92 have troubling consequences because the Government can
choose which defendants to subject to forfeiture proceedings, and hence, which attorneys
to target. Thus, the CFA (as interpreted in Monsanto) undermines the integrity of the
adversary system.
Critics claim that permitting forfeiture of legitimate
attorneys' fees provides the government with a
negative and improper power to influence the
defendant's choice of counsel. The power is negative
because it allows the government to exclude the
"best" private sector attorneys from RICO and CCE
cases by "channeling" defendants away from them. In
its rawest form, the channeling power would allow
the government to prevent the most competent
defense attorneys from handling these complex
cases.

93

In Strickland v. Washington,94 the Supreme Court held that "the right to counsel
plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment."95 The
Court added that "'the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.'
Government violates the right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways
with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the
defense."96 By holding the threat of a CFA forfeiture proceeding over the head of
defense counsel, "the government would have the ability to deprive a defendant, not of
some attorney, but of the97 lawyer the defendant wants most (and perhaps the one the
government most fears).
In laniello, however, the court did not consider the counsel-of-choice deprivation
question to be an important issue. The majority declined to discuss the right to an attorney
of choice at length, because, "more importantly, forfeiture would result in an abridgement
of [defendants'] right to [any] counsel," 98 because under those circumstances "defendants
in RICO actions would find it difficult, if not impossible, to secure representation."' 99 The
wealthy defendant would have to assert poverty in order to qualify for appointed counsel,
but because he has assets, the wealthy defendant is unable to do so. "His problem is not
inability to pay a legal fee but that lawyers will refuse to accept his retainer and will

91 If asset-freezing occurs before trial, conventional wisdom would have it that the presumption of

innocence accorded to every defendant precludes us from assuming that the disputed funds were illegally
obtained at all (this would be true of the bank robber's assets, as well). However, given Salerno, this
presumption has been reduced to a mere standard of proof at trial. See discussion infra part VI.D.
92 This includes the related prosecutorial imperviousness to allegations of abuse.
93 Cloud, supra note 25, at 44.

94 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
95 Id. at 685.
96 Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
97 Cloud, supra note 25, at 45.
98 United States v. Ianiello, 644 F.Supp. 452, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
99 Id. (citing United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
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refuse to represent him."' o A fee forfeiture action would, therefore, effectively deny a
RICO or CCE defendant the services of paid counsel. Furthermore, the courts in both
lanniello and Badalamenti observe that such a defendant could not lawfully obtain
appointed counsel.' 0'
Persons "financially unable to obtain adequate representation' 0 2 may be
furnished appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act. °3 To obtain the services
of appointed counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, a defendant must swear under oath to his
financial inability to obtain counsel. 4 If he has funds to pay for an attorney, then he
cannot swear that he is financially unable to obtain counsel.' °5 Such a defendant is
caught between a rock and a hard place: "He can get neither a paid lawyer, nor a free
06

one."1

But even if our defendant somehow receives appointed counsel, he may not have
won the battle; the "harsh reality is that appointed counsel is probably inadequate for
lengthy and complex RICO and CCE cases. Public defender offices already lack the
human and material resources necessary to battle the Justice Department in these
cases."'0 7 The defense of a RICO case involves:
[T]he marshalling of facts and information of vast
quantities perhaps constituting the whole of several
worldwide business enterprises. The government
brings to bear significant resources to prosecute these
cases. Adequate defense of RICO cases generally
requires
representation
during grand jury
investigations lasting as long as two to three years.
Counsel appointed ninety or one hundred and twenty
days before trial is patently inadequate. It is not
consistent with due process to create a situation which
eliminates the adversary from the adversary
process. 0t 8

1o Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197.
101 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197.
102

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1988).

103

18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988).

104 This can be done either by affidavit or oral testimony. Id.
105

"The Government's assertion that it would not contest such an appointment would not remedy the

situation. The duty rests upon a judicial officer to determine whether a person is financially eligible for the
appointment of counsel and not the United States Attorney's Office." lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457.
106 United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Cloud, supra note 25, at 47; See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo.
1985). The costs of mounting a defense of an indictment under RICO are far beyond the resources or
expertise of the average federal public defender's office which is already over taxed. Id.Federal defenders
agree with the conclusion that they lack the resources to represent RICO and CCE defendants. See
Forfeiture of Assets Intendedfor Use as Attorney's Fees: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 228 (1986) (Statement of Edward Marek, Federal Defender N.D. Ohio and
Federal Legislative Subcommittee, on Behalf of the Federal Public Defenders and Federal Community
Defenders).
108 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349-50.
107
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Of course, it is conceivable that a RICO or CCE defendant could retain "[a]
lawyer who was so foolish, ignorant, beholden or idealistic as to take the
business.... " 09 Nevertheless, Sixth Amendment problems would remain.
Retained counsel confront an ethical obstacle course, but appointed counsel face
a "more complex set of problems. [These arise] when federal defenders are unavailable
and private counsel is appointed under the Criminal Justice Act."" 0 In fact, appointed
counsel "may be even less capable than full-time defenders' offices at mounting a defense
in these difficult cases""' because the "minimal compensation awarded appointed
counsel under the Criminal Justice Act" 2 virtually guarantees that the most competent
attorneys will refuse appointment in complex criminal entity prosecutions brought under
the RICO and CCE statutes.""' 3
B. Ethical Impediments to Effective Assistance of Counsel
In Strickland v. Washington,' the Supreme Court held that assistance of
counsel for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment means effective assistance of
counsel.' '5 The effectiveness of counsel's representation is necessarily undermined by
the countless ethical problems presented by the forfeiture action. This is true whether, at
the time of counsel's retainer, the Government has already moved for pre-trial forfeiture
of defendant's assets or whether the forfeiture action is merely a possibility.
To begin with, representing a CCE or RICO defendant is likely to constitute an
ethical violation. Once the Government has initiated forfeiture proceedings, the attorney's
retention of his fee depends on the acquittal of his client. Such an arrangement is a
contingent fee for the purposes of DR 2-106(C), which provides that - regardless of the
degree to which the fee arrangements comply with DR 2-106(C) - the collection of
contingency fees in criminal cases violates the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(MCPR)."16

109 lanniello, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
110 "This may be necessary because the judicial district lacks a defender's office, or because real or

potential conflicts of interest among multiple defendants require that a single public defenders' office may
not represent them all" (citations omitted). Cloud, supra note 25, at 48.
III Id.
112 The CJA commands that "compensation shall not exceed $60 per hour for time in court and $40
per hour for time 'reasonably expended out of court.' 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(l) (1988). The statute also
limits the total compensation per attorney in a case to $3,500 for felony cases and $1,000 for misdemeanors.
18 U.S.C § 3006A(d)(2) (1988). Concededly, the CJA permits waiver of these maximum amounts in
complex cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3) (1988), and also authorizes the court to authorize payment for
"investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense," 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1988),
but limits any payment to a maximum of $300. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A(e)(l), (3). "These amounts are facially
inadequate to pay the costs of the defense of a complex case." See United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp.
869, 871 (E.D. Wis. 1986). Fees above the statutory limit can be paid; realistically, however, the hourly
rates paid are low, and the fee paid under the Act will in all probability not be adequate compensation for
the defense. Id.; Cloud, supra note 25, at 48 n.229.
113 Cloud, supra note 25, at 48.
"14 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
115 Id. at 686.
116 The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY provides that "A lawyer shall not enter into
an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1981) [hereinafter Code].
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Assuming that defense counsel ignores DR 2-106 in favor of EC 1-i," 7 he
faces threats to the attorney-client privilege: "[I]f the attorney were to represent the
defendant and the defendant were convicted, defense counsel, in challenging the forfeiture
of the legal fee, would be required to establish that he had no reasonable cause to believe
that the property was subject to forfeiture.""' The evidence of such lack of knowledge
would "necessitate the disclosure of privileged matter confided to counsel by his
client."" 9 Such disclosure would be necessary because the attorney would be required
to discuss the activities of his client and to report the substance of conversations which
are ordinarily privileged. The question the attorney would be required to answer is,
"Where did your client get his money?" Would the attorney be expected to answer, "Well,
ten percent of my fee came from a transaction wherein my client sold a kilogram of
cocaine, but the rest of it is bona fide"? 2 ° An attorney who remained willfully ignorant
of his client's activities would be compromising the quality of his representation. Thus,
an attorney facing an 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) proceeding would be required either to violate
the attorney-client privilege.' or to restrict "the free flow of information required
between attorney and client for an adequate defense,"'22 thereby "depriving defendant
of effective representation under the Sixth Amendment."' 23

117

"A basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is that every person in our society

should have ready access to the independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence ..
" Id. at EC I-1.
118 United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)).
119 Id.
120

Constitutional rights are afforded guilty defendants as well as innocent defendants. Furthermore, a

defendant may disclose uncharged or undetected crimes to his attorney in the course of the representation.
121 Ethical Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a "lawyer should preserve
the confidences and secrets of a client." Disciplinary Rule 4-101 states in relevant pan:
Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.
(A) 'Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law, and 'secret' refers to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the
client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of
the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of
himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
Code, supra note 116, at DR 4-101.
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law ....
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients .... The privilege recognizes that
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy
depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client."
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 John H. Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 2290
(McNaughton rev. 1961)). Effective representation "can only be safely and readily availed of when free from
the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure." Id. at 389 (citing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470
(1888)). See also Howard J. Weintraub, Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees Under the 1984 Comprehensive Crime
Control Act, 22 GA. ST. B.J. 67, 72 (1986).
122 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457.
123 Id.
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Worse, the service of a subpoena on defense counsel challenging him to
demonstrate the legitimacy of the source of funds might result in the use of counsel's
testimony as evidence of the crimes charged against defendant. A lawyer facing, such a
subpoena might be forced to withdraw from representation of his client.' 24 In
Badalamenti, such a subpoena was served ten months after the return of the indictment
"and six months after [counsel's] appearance in a case of gargantuan proportions."'' 25
In such a situation, counsel's "credibility would then be before the jury and these issues
might become a distracting focus of the jury's attention. ''126
The attorney deciding to represent a defendant in a CCE or RICO case faces both
severe economic consequences, (and recall that the Government might seek forfeiture of
his fee under the CFA as early as before the indictment or as late as after conviction) and
potential sanctions for accepting a contingency fee in a criminal case. Meanwhile, the
ethical difficulties undermining his effectiveness or his credibility 27 form a discouraging
obstacle course.
Most of these pitfalls involve inevitable conflicts of interest between lawyer and
client. Some of these traps catch only financially vulnerable or unethical counsel. For
instance, "[d]efense counsel might seek to negotiate a guilty plea by his client, motivated,
not by his client's best interests, but rather by his own desire to avoid forfeiture of his
fee."' 1 8 However, even an ethically unimpeachable attorney might attempt to minimize
costs in situations where his options involve choosing between a high-risk strategy that,
if successful, would serve the best interest of his client and an alternative that contained
a lower risk but a less favorable outcome for the defendant. Such decisions are tough
under the best of circumstances; but, the possibility of fee forfeiture presents an added
pressure - to choose the most financially conservative option instead of the one best
29
calculated to serve the client's interests, which would be a violation of the MCPR.1
Furthermore, the MCPR requires counsel to exercise independent judgment on behalf of
a client, 131 which, of course, involves avoiding acquisition of a financial interest in a
criminal case. 3'
In lanniello the court recognized:
[F]orfeiture of attorney's fees, or even the threat of such forfeiture, is
of greater significance than forfeiture of one's Rolls-Royce. Forfeiture
of the latter affects only one's property rights, while forfeiture, or the

124 The Disciplinary Rules require withdrawal under circumstances when "[it is apparent that [the
attorney's] testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client." Code, supra note 114 DR 5-102(B). Of course,
an exception provides that withdrawal is not required only if "the testimony [would] relate solely to the..
value of legal services rendered in the case[,]" but it would not take a rocket scientist to figure out that
counsel's testimony must exceed that scope. Id. at DR 5-102(A); DR 5-101(B)(3) (1981).
125 United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
126 Id. at 199. See also, MacArthur v. Bank of New York, 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1208'(S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(noting that the bar is ill-served when an attorney's veracity becomes an issue in a case; lay observers
especially might speculate whether counsel has compromised his integrity on the stand in order to prevail in
the litigation).
127 That is, before the jury. For instance, a jury might be tempted to believe that the attorney was
motivated to secure the acquittal of his client only so as to avoid jeopardizing his fee, or "[m]embers of the
jury might well resent the fee and see [defense counsel] as an unconscionable partner in the narcotics
business." Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 199.
128 United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
129 Code, supra note 116 at DR 5-103(A) and EC 5-1, 2, 3, 7.
130 Id. at DR 5-101.
131 Id. at DR 5-103.
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possibility of forfeiture, of attorney's fees affects, in a very material
way, defendant's preparation of his legal defense and the determination
of his guilt or innocence.'32
This is especially true in complicated RICO prosecutions, in which the defendant will
likely retain counsel as soon as he learns that he is under investigation, and in which
counsel may spend months preparing for trial because of the 1massive
amount of
33
information and the number and complexity of the issues involved.
V. THE POLITICAL CLIMATE PRECEDING THE COMPREHENSIVE FORFEITURE
ACT CAUSED BOTH THE ADOPTION OF THE ACT AND THE PAUCITY OF ITS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Legitimate (and hysterical) fears of nsing drug use and drug-related violence,"'
combined with an increasing alarm at the growing presence of organized crime, created
a volatile political climate. Panic resulted in the War on Drugs and the CFA:
In the eleventh hour of the 98th Congress, the RICO forfeiture
provisions were amended to add more teeth to government attacks on
racketeering and to clear up legal disputes among the circuit courts. The
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which included the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, amending RICO, was so hastily
passed that not all of the Act's pages were included in the copy
provided the President for his signature on October 12, 1985. The exact
contents of the Act were so uncertain that portions of the bill not
enacted were included in the United States Code Annotated advance
35
sheet of the law.
Predictably, "perhaps because of the issue of 'crime in the streets' that was given
prominence during the 1984 presidential campaign ... [the Act was] buried in an
appropriations measure as a vehicle for enactment."' 3 6 The hastiness with which CFA
was drafted precludes us from reading too much into the sparse legislative history.
A. As Drug Use and Drug-Related Violence Increase, the Influence of Organized Crime
Widens
"The Federal Government has been trying to do something about illegal narcotics
since at least 1887, when Congress adopted restrictions on opium imports. But drug sales
have climbed steadily, soaring in 1980 to an estimated $79 billion."' 37 Just prior to the
passage of the CFA, the popular perception was that the immense profits generated by the

132

lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457-58. See also United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir.

1984).
lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 458.
"Of the 438 homicides committed in the District of Columbia [in 1989], more than half were drugrelated." Lloyd Shearer, Intelligence Report, PARADE MAG., Feb. 25, 1990, at 10.
135 United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1336 (D. Colo. 1985).
136 B. JAMES GEORGE, JR., THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984 (1986).
133

134

137

4, at 4.

Michael Wright et al., AdministrationPlans a Wider War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1982, §
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out of control.' 39 In fact, a
drug trade 3 ' had thrown drug dealing and drug abuse
140
wave."'
"tidal
was
common metaphor for the drug crisis
A related article in the Christian Science Monitor in 1983, reported:
A new tidal wave of illicit heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and
manmade "uppers," "downers," sedative-hypnotics and hallucinatory
drugs has gathered swift force in the last two years and is flooding
across the United States, Western Europe, and much of the Third
World.
Altogether it adds up to the worst drug crisis the world has yet
faced, according to experts,, doctors, diplomats, social workers, and
countries contacted by this
politicians in producing and Consuming
141
months.
three
last
the
in
newspaper
The perception thit the drug tiade was drowning the country existed at the
popular level as well ds in Government. Indeed, the President's i982 "antidrug initiative
upon an indifferent public but drew energy from a broad
was not imposed from above
42
support.'
political
base of
Furthermore, the President had the support of Congres§ as well as the executive
branch. "[T]he Attorney General's Thsk Force on Violent Crime had recommended ''an
143
unequivocal commitment to combatting international and domestic 'drug traffic."
"[T]wenty-eight Senators had banded together in the Drig Enforcement Caucus in order
to 'establish drug enforcement as a Senate priority.' In addition, the House Select
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control had urged the President to 'declare war on
drugs.""44

138 Estimated by the Government in 1987 to be as high as "$80-100 billion in yearly revenues, $30

billion of it from cocaine alone." Steven Wisotsky, Introduction: In Search of a Breakthrough in the War on
Drugs, 11 NOVA L.J. 891, 898 (1987).
In 1985, NORML estimated that "marijuana is [the] largest United Statbs dash crop, worth about
$14 billion per year." Milestones in the War on Drugs, II NOVA L.J. 1041, 1048 (1987). See GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSET FORFEITURE-A SELDOM USED TOOL IN COMBAirINGDRUG TRAFFICKING,

April 10, 1981; see also Forfeiture in Durg Cases: Hearings on H.R. 2646, H.R 2910, H.R. 4110 and H.R.
5371 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d. Sess.
(1981) (statement of Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr., Chief of Narcotics Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of
Justice).
139 Former Rep. Lester Wolff, formerly chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse
and Control, and currently chairman of the National Association for City Drug andiAlcohol Coordination,
"[told a news conference that] 'There are many shooting wars around the World today, but no shooting war
is more important to the people of this country than the so-called "war on drugs."' . . . He estimated cuts in
federal drug programs at $200 million in the past year, and said if they continue, 'It means we are in for a
crime wave of a magnitude never before experienced."' D'Vera Cohn, UNITED PRESS INT'L, (Washington,
D.C.) June 11, 1982. See generally THE NAT'L NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMM'N, NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (1983).
140 The drug crisis is described as "a rapidly rising tide of drug abuse exacerbated by the pernicious
effects of a drug trafficking parasite of international dimensions." Wisotsky, supra note 138, at 891. The
preceding quotation not only indicates the public perception of the magnitude of the drug problem in the
United States, but also demonstrates one of the most ghastly effects of the drug crisis: the overwhelming
proliferation of mixed metaphors. See also, In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1034 (5th
Cir.1982).
141 David K. Willis, Stemming the Drug Tide, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 15, 1983, at 22.
142 Wisotsky, supra note 138, at 893.
143 Id.

144 Id.
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Anti-drug activity of state agencies mirrored their federal counterparts. The
Texas legislature proposed harsher penalties for possession of more than fifty pounds of
marijuana - from the original maximum penalties of ten years in prison and a $5000 fine
to life in prison and a $250,000 fine. 45 Most dramatically, the national and state militia
became involved in what has traditionally been considered a domestic problem under the
jurisdiction of municipal police forces. For example, in December 1982, the Adjuctant
General Carl Wallace said that the Tennessee National Guard had "a fleet of transport
planes and 90 helicopters at the disposal of the governor if called upon for use in the war
on illegal drug traffic.'' 46 In addition,
The Department of Defense provided pursuit planes, helicopters and
other equipment to civilian enforcement agencies, while Navy
"hawkeye" radar planes patrolled the coastal skies in search of
smuggling aircraft and ships. The Coast Guard, receiving new cutters
and more personnel, intensified its customary task of interdicting drugcarrying vessels at sea. Finally, for the first time in American history,
Naval ships, including a nuclear-powered anti-aircraft carrier, interdicted
- and in one case fired upon - drug-smuggling ships in international
waters. "47
The Government's efforts to contain the drug industry even extended abroad. For
example, in November 1982, the Federal government offered the new government of
Bolivia "about $140 million in aid to be given as the South American nation cracks down
on its narcotics producers and traffickers, and turns over to American authorities a
Bolivian whom U.S. officials allege is a major international cocaine dealer." 48 The
economic aid was prompted by Reagan administration contentions that "effforts at
narcotics control within the United States have had almost no impact on the rapidly
growing use of cocaine,"' 149 as well as by the increasingly alarming consumption of
whole nations, such as the Bahamas, Columbia, and Peru, s° by drug cartels.' 5'
In the United States, the illegal drug trade is dominated by organized crime. The
link between organized criminal syndicates and the illegal drug industry has been
demonstrated many times. In 1982, for instance:
The Reagan administration, as part of its war on drugs and organized
crime, announced ... the arrest of 13 members of a major heroin
trafficking group linked directly to two New York crime "families."...
[Attorney General William French] Smith described the link between

145 UNITED PRESS INT'L, (Austin, Texas) Nov. 24, 1982. The bill was declared unconstitutional
by

the 3rd District Court of Appeals because the Texas constitution "voids any legislative act which fails to
include all the subjects of the bill in its title." Id.
146 UNITED PRESS INT'L, (Nashville, Tennessee) Dec. 18, 1982.
147 Wisotsky, supra note 138, at 894.
148 Walter Pincus, Aid to Bolivia Tied to Progress in Cocaine War, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1982, at AI.
149 Id.
150 Wisotsky, supra note 138, at 898.
151

Concern about the domination of foreign governments by "narcoterrorism," is more than a

paternalistic exercise on the part of the United States, since often the besieged governments are friendly to
the United States and so the criminal activities of syndicates abroad have the potential to affect U.S.
diplomatic and national security interests. See Wisotsky, supra note 138, at 898.
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organized crime and drug 1trafficking
as "the most serious crime problem
52
facing the nation today."'
A "traditional [method] the Columbo Family employed to make money illegally was the
sale of narcotics and other dangerous drugs"' 53 such as cocaine, heroin, and
marijuana."'
The billion-dollar underground economy "[feeds] the growth of powerful crime
syndicates willing to commit murder and to corrupt public officials in order to protect
their operations. One quarter of all the homicides in Miami, Los Angeles and New York
are ...drug hits or drug rip-offs."' 55 Not only do the drug trade and organized crime
syndicates enjoy a chicken-and-the-egg relationship, but at least as early as ten years ago,
organized criminal syndicates began proliferating and mutating into forms beyond the
traditional, primarily northeastern La Cosa Nostra.56
For example, a New York Times article in 1982 reported the emergence of a
new, sophisticated, organized criminal syndicate that some Southern law enforcement
officials termed "The Dixie Mafia."' 57 "The growth [of organized crime in the South]
is marked not only by the influx of drugs, particularly marijuana and cocaine, the officials
say, but also by organized car theft, prostitution and pornography rings and complex fraud
and money-laundering operations."' 58
Southern organized crime differs from its Northern, ethnic counterpart in a
frightening way:' 59 The Southern mafia targets prosecutors and judges. In 1982 Charles
Voyde Harrelson was convicted in Texas of assassinating Judge John H. Wood, Jr. under
the auspices of Jamiel Chagra, a drug dealer who "'had so much money he didn't count
it, he weighed it." 1 '°
Wood was the first federal judge to be assassinated in this century,' 6' but his
fate has become increasingly commonplace. "Some prosecutors and judges in Florida have
learned that they are part of a frightening role reversal .... [T]hey are, the authorities say,
being convicted and sentenced to death by gangs involved in drug sales or other organized
crime."'162 The March 14, 1982 edition of The New York Times lists prosecutors, state
attorneys, and investigators
who had been assassinated or targeted for assassination by
63
criminal enterprises.

152

Juan Waite, UNITED PRESS INT'L, at Wash. News Section, Nov. 4, 1982.

153 Persico brief (No. 86-1468), supra note 2, at 44.

Id. at 47.
155 Wisotsky, supra note 138, at 898.
156 New York City's mafia consists of five La Cosa Nostra families 154

the Bonanno, Columbo,

Gambino, Genovese, and Lucchese families. La Cosa Nostra is Italian for "Our Thing."
157 Wayne King, New Criminal Class is Flourishing in Sun Belt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1982, § 1,at
I.
158 Id.
La Cosa Nostra has operated in Miami and New Orleans for a long time, but it had never achieved
the influence it enjoys in the North. Id.
160 Id.
159

161 Id.

162 Drug Gangs Threaten Judges and Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1982, § 1,at 31.
163 Of course, law-enforcement agents were not the only targets of drug-related violence. In 1982, the
murder rate in Miami was the highest in the nation. "The high number of murders per capita is largely
blamed on the illicit drug industry. Law-enforcement officials have said that those involved in drug sales
are playing for stakes in the billions of dollars and have a high propensity for seeking revenge." Id.
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While the Dixie mafia was emerging in the South," the Japanese mafia,
Yakuza, 65 spread to the United States and was proliferating in Hawaii and California,
where it not only engaged in drug trafficking but also "appeared to be buying legitimate
American businesses in Hawaii or on the West Coast to use as covers for other
operations."' 66 Moreover, the Taiwanese
organized crime syndicate, United Bamboo,
67
also spread to the United States.
B. The Government's Response
The Reagan Administration responded to the explosion of drug-related violence
and the widespread distribution of illegal drugs by increasingly sophisticated and ruthless
associations with fanfare and force. On October 12, 1982, President Reagan unveiled
Washington's latest plan of attack, a $160 million program of special task forces in twelve
cities. 6 This "War on Drugs" was intended to "choke the nation's drug peddling and
'cripple the power of the mob,' which law enforcement says is responsible for much of
the trafficking."' 169 Specifically, the War on Drugs called for:
(1) More personnel - 1,020 law enforcement agents for DEA, FBI and
other agencies, 200 Assistant United States Attorneys, and 340 clerical
staff; (2) more aggressive law enforcement - creating twelve (later
thirteen) regional Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces...
in "core cities" across the nation "to identify, investigate, and prosecute
members of high-level drug trafficking enterprises, and to destroy the
operations of those organizations"; (3) more money - $127.5 million
in additional funding, and substantial re-allocation of the existing
$7.028 million budget away from prevention, treatment, and research
programs to law enforcement programs; (4) more prison bed space addition of 1260 beds at 11 federal prisons to accommodate the increase
in drug offenders to be incarcerated; (5) more stringent laws - a
"legislative offensive designed to win approval of reforms" with respect
to bail, sentencing, criminal forfeiture and the exclusionary rule; (6)
more (better) inter-agency coordination, bringing together all federal law
enforcement agencies in "a comprehensive attack on drug trafficking
and organized crime" under a Cabinet level committee chaired by the

164 See, e.g., United States v. Love, 534 F.2d 87 (1976); United States v. Perry, 512 F.2d 805 (1975).
165 Japanese Smuggling Network Said to be Spreading to Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1982, at A18.
"Yakuza" is the Japanese term for organized crime. Id.
166 Id.
167 The United Bamboo was founded in Taiwan approximately three decades ago. Over
the years, the enterprise has extended its activities to Hong Kong, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and most recently the United States. In this country, the United
Bamboo has established its operations in Houston, Los Angeles, San Francisco and
New York. The members and associates of the organization in the United States
established the United Bamboo's presence here through involvement in various illegal
activities such as prostitution, illegal gambling, assisting fugitives from justice,
extortion, kidnapping, murder, and trafficking in guns and narcotics.
United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 549 (2d Cir. 1988).
168 Judi Hassan, Reagan Pledges War on Drugs, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 15, 1982, at Washington
News.
169

Id.
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Attorney General; and (7) improved federal-state coordination, including
federal training of State agents. 70
Rhetoric about the War on Drugs was greeted with cynicism by the public, by
State enforcement agents, and by people responsible for allocating resources. For example,
a New York Times editorial contended:
Announcing a new White House drive against organized crime prior to
a national election looks, well, political. There are no new funds for the
program....
The new plan at least recognizes a need for more manpower .... Administration officials say that the program will cost
between $160 million and $200 million [per year], all financed from
available funds.
To justify this approach, the Administration ...point[s] to
South Florida, where drug-related arrests are up 40 percent and the
amounts of seized marijuana and cocaine are nearly doubled. If that
project demonstrates the effect of concentrating resources in a single
area, however, it also revealed the determination of drug dealers; they
now avoid South Florida and use ports in the Northeast. 7 '
The New York Times editorial did more than criticize administration policy, it also
highlighted two common sources of frustration: If drug enforcement officials concentrate
their resources on one place, drug dealers just move to another. In order for Government to win a war fought purely by enforcment, resources must be geographically
omnipresent. 72
'
In December 1982, the Justice Department asked a Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee for $130 million to pay for the War on Drugs. Senators retorted that $130
million was "a drop in the bucket"'' 73 compared to the amount of money needed to
achieve effective results, adding that the Reagan Administration had proposed the previous
year to cut the budget of the FBI by six percent and the DEA by twelve percent and had
insisted that those cuts would not be detrimental to the effectiveness of those
agencies. 174 The expenses for the twelve (later thirteen) new task forces were to come
out of existing funds - "with the tricky stipulation that none could come from the Justice
Department or other law enforcement activities."'175 Then-Associate Attorney General
Rudolph Giuliani added, "'We cannot turn the tide against crime while keeping law

170 Id. (emphasis added); see also Wisotsky, supra note 138, at 892.
171 Mr. Reagan's New Tack on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1982, at A16 (emphasis added).
172 Id.
173 Mary Thornton, Justice Asks $130 Million For Drug War, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1982, at Al.
174 Id.
175 Mary Thornton & Walter Pincus, Crime Fighters at War Over Money, Turf, WASH. POST, Oct. 29,

1982, at A27.
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enforcement budgets at their current services levels. 17 6 Simply put, we need additional
resources. ...

'"'77

In the meantime, even though convictions had been secured against organized
crime figures in unprecedented numbers, 78 the Mafia continued to thrive - primarily
because although Mafia defendants were confined in prison, the organizations remained
intact:
The activities of a criminal organization such as the Genovese Family
do not cease with the arrest of its principals and their release on even
the most stringent of bail conditions. The illegal businesses, in place for
many years, require constant attention and protection, or they will fail.
Under these circumstances, this court recognizes a strong incentive on
the part of its leadership to continue business as usual ....

[B]usiness

as usual involves threats, beatings, and murder.' 79
As was noted above, incarcerated members of these organizations are adept at corrupting
prison officials or committing any other acts necessary to permit them to communicate
with their associates on the outside and maintain their leadership of, or participation in,
their illegal enterprises. Hence, incarceration of a few leading figures has a minimal effect
on the operations of organized criminal syndicates. However, once any organization runs
out of money, it begins to run out of steam.
C. Legislative Silence: an Unintended Result
As we have seen, the CFA was a product of the political climate and was meant
not only to help solve the problem but to help pay for the solution.' The drug crisis
was the subject of national focus, and organized crime was broadening its reach.
Moreover, the CFA was drafted and introduced during an election year. These
circumstances resulted in a hurried legislative package and minimal legislative history.
What legislative history there is to the CFA with reference to third parties
indicates that the legislature was concerned about money-laundering and sham transfers.
Hence, given the circumstances surrounding the development of the CFA, we should not
interpret legislative silence on the subject of attorneys' fees as anything but a sloppy
mistake.

176

See, e.g., Ethan Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences, and

Alternatives, 245 SCIENCE 9, Sept. 1, 1989. "Law enforcement efforts have been increasingly successful in
this country, but this has had little effect on the price, availability or consumption of drugs. These law
enforcement efforts are costly.... In 1987, the government spent 10 billion dollars in the enforcement of
drug laws." Id.
177 Thornton & Pincus, supra note 175.
178 See, e.g., United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1986) (citing United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp.
1364, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
180 See Hearings, supra note 15, at 16.
179
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TRADITIONAL AMERICAN JURISPRUDENTIAL INSTITUTIONS SHOULD SERVE AS AIDS
TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE FORFEITURE ACT

A. Toward a Policy of Legislative Interpretation
Stories with morals are usually banal, but true. The story of the controversy
surrounding the correct interpretation of the CFA, with its quick but unhappy ending, is
no exception. The story suggests that a new rule of construction regarding legislative
silence should be supported: If legislation is intended to impinge upon constitutional
rights, reasonably or not, the legislature should plainly articulate in the record its
intentions regarding those interests. Otherwise, in cases where the statutory language and
the legislative history are silent or ambiguous, the courts should look not only to the
relevant case law, but also to American jurisprudential traditions. This is especially true
in the context of a criminal statute or a statutory interpretation affecting the rights of a
criminal defendant.
To help us with the CFA, we not only have the line of Sixth Amendment cases
descended from Powell, but also those descended from Bell v. United States... advocating a policy of lenity in the construction of criminal statutes. Furthermore, the tradition
in American jurisprudence with regard to criminal forfeitures is highly illuminating.
B. Traditions of Statutory Construction: Godzilla versus Bambi
Traditionally, courts have strictly construed criminal statutes and have resolved
ambiguity in favor of lenity toward defendants. In Bifulco v. United States,'82 the Court
articulated this policy:
In past cases the Court has made it clear that this principle of statutory
construction applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit
of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose ....
"This
policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal
statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when
such an interpretation83can be based on no more than a guess as to what
1
Congress intended."'
The rule of lenity is only applied in the face of "statutory ambiguity."' 84 As the Court
made plain in Bifulco, "Where Congress has manifested its intention, we may not
manufacture ambiguity in order to defeat that intent."' 85 Of course, manufacturing
ambiguity in the CFA is unnecessary.
In the meantime, Congress has instructed the courts to construe RICO broadly
to effectuate its remedial purpose.'86

181 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955); see also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (noting that
ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity).
182 447 U.S. 381 (1980).
183 Id. at 387 (citations omitted) (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)).
184 Id. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980).

185 Bifulco, 447 U.S at 387.
186 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922,
947. See also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
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Govertiment attorneys argue that since its purpose is to attack the roots
of organized crime, and forfeiture of attorney's fees would help
prosecutors to achieve that purpose by making it easier for them to
obtain convictions of defendants represented by less experienced
counsel, attorneys' fees should not be exempt from forfeiture. 7
Such a policy constitutes an impermissible disruption of the adversary system. Meanwhile,
the admonition to construe RICO broadly so as to effectuate its remedialput-pose presents
us with two issues: First, are the inevitable effects of a harsh reading of the CFA a part
of the remedial purpose of RICO? Second, should the CFA be read broadly as a RICO
statute, or should we consider its genesis as a separate entity and read it solely in light
of Bell?
The CFA was incorporated into RICO, but it also amended the CCE statutes,
which say nothing in the text oroin the legislative history about being construed broadly.
The courts have obliged themselves to "interpret statutes to avoid the 'unnecessary
analysis of constitutional issues." 8 Allowing attorneys' fees to fall within the ambit
of the CFA would violate that rule of statutory construction. Similarly, a reading of RICO
that inferred as part of its remedial purpose an intent to so manipulate the adversary
system, and the Sixth Amendment protections that inform it, would be equally violative
of that rule. Furthermore, ascribing RICO broadness to the provisions of the CFA would
be difficult, because the CFA was drafted as an independent provision and should be
construed according to its own legislative history.'89
C. The Hostile Treatment of In Personam Forfeiture Provisions in American Law
Not only is an application of the CFA broad enough to encompass bona fide
attorneys' fees contrary to established rules of statutory construction, but criminal
forfeiture provisions as a whole run counter to American jurisprudential tradition. 9 °
Prior to 1970, when criminal forfeiture provisions were introduced into RICO and
CCE,' 9' "the only federal law with in personam forfeiture was the Confiscation Act of

187

Richard W. Mass, Note, Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed to Retain

the "Rolls Royce of Attorneys" with the "Fruits of the Crime"?, 39 STAN. L. REV. 663, 668 (1987).
188 Id. at 669 (citing United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1339 (D. Colo. 1985)); see also

Siler v. Louisville

& N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
Otherwise, a necessary argument would be that a court could construe the CFA broadly in RICO
cases and narrowly in CCE cases. The result of that practice would be to ignore the legislative history of
the CFA and alternately substitute that of RICO or CCE. In addition to being wrong, that practice would
have unintended complications. For example, here, allowing two alternative constructions of a statute results
in the anomalous conclusion that its drafters had two simultaneous but opposite intentions (i.e., RICO
broadness and Bell lenity).
190 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW.
191 CCE was passed as part of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91189

513, § 408; RICO was passed as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 901(a).
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92
1862 which authorized the President to seize the life estate of Confederate soldiers."'
Until recently, the RICO and CCE provisions were not widely used.' 93
Criminal forfeiture actions under the CFA result from a conflation of in rem and
in personam legal theory and a departure from traditional American notions of forfeiture.
A criminal, as opposed to a civil, asset forfeiture "was a part, or at least a consequence,
of the judgment of [the defendant's] conviction"' 94 and did not turn on the question of
whether the assets themselves were illegal. Instead, a forfeiture action under the CFA is
an in personam proceeding: the CFA reaches all of a defendant's assets resulting from his
criminal conduct, as characterized by a trial court. Thus, the ultimate forfeitability of
defendant's assets turns on the question of guilt. However, the most controversial
provisions, which permit the Government to reach assets prior to conviction, even after
transfer to third parties, have their jurisprudential origins in a traditionally civil cause of
action, namely, an in rem proceeding.
In a conventional civil forfeiture proceeding, "[t]he thing is here primarily
considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing; and
this, whether the offence be malum prohibitum, or malum in se."'95 The property is
considered to be the defendant and is considered to be "tainted" by its illegality. Objects
seized through an in rem proceeding are generally "property that constitutes evidence of
the commission of a criminal offense; or ...contraband, the fruits of crime, or things
otherwise criminally possessed; ... or property designed or intended for use or which is
or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense ... "96The legal
fiction that the thing itself is the wrongdoer permits the government to seize it even if the
original owner transfers the thing to a third party, because the object is tainted regardless
of who owns it. In contrast with the burden in a criminal prosecution, the burden of proof
in a civil forfeiture proceeding is minimal.' 97 Since criminal fines or forfeitures usually
turn on the guilt of the defendant, the criminal forfeiture proceeding usually occurs after
conviction. The relation-back and third-party provisions in the CFA amendments add an
in rem, civil element to the criminal proceeding.
Historically, American jurisprudence has not favored in personam forfeiture.
More accurately and pithily, United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Politz stated
in a dissenting opinion:

[O]ur society has abhorred forfeitures. . . . [T]he framers of the
Constitution demonstrated their repudiation of the harsh English
tradition of criminal forfeiture, and our very first Congress forbade the

192 William J. Hughes & Edward H. O'Connell, Jr., In Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal
Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition Into A Modern Dilemma, II PEPP. L. REV. 613,
619-20 (1984) (citing Confiscation Act, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589 (1862)).
193 As the title of our report indicates, the Government's record in attacking crime through
the forfeiture of assets is not good. And the Government's failure is not limited to
drug trafficking.... In our April 1981 report, we recommended that the Attorney
General improve forfeiture management and that the Congress clarify and broaden the
scope of criminal forfeiture statutes-the Racketeer Influenced Criminal Enterprise
provision (RICO) and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise provision (CCE).
Hearings, supra note 15, at 33-34 (Statement of William J. Anderson, Director General, Government
Division of the General Accounting Office).
194 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
195 Id.
196 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
197 For example, the standard of evidence in the civil drug forfeiture statute is a "preponderance of the
evidence." 21 U.S.C. § 881.
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forfeiture of an estate because of a criminal conviction. Further, a
forfeiture with an in personam application, as we have before us, is to
be most charily assessed.""'
In rem forfeiture proceedings are common and accepted, and the "general
antipathy in our law for in personam forfeiture relates primarily to forfeiture of
estate." 199 Hence, the origin of American hostility to in personam forfeiture is derived:
"[U]nder early English law the complete forfeiture of all real and personal property
followed as a consequence of conviction for a felony or treason. 2 0 After conviction for
one of those offenses, "the defendant's 'blood was corrupted' so that nothing could pass
by inheritance to his line."2' '
Decrees of forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood for treason were banned
by the Constitution in 1787. Furthermore, until 1970, in personam provisions were
effectively absent from the criminal code, indicating the survival of legislative abhorrence
to them. Prior to the passage of RICO, the only federal law with in personam forfeiture
provisions applied to Confederate soldiers.
The miscegenation of in rem and in personam statutory elements has yielded a
criminal statute with a civil standard of proof. The forfeiture action under CFA is
predicated on guilt that the prosecution has yet to prove, and its ultimate effect where
applied to attorneys' fees is to make a criminal defendant more vulnerable to conviction.
Therefore, the CFA, as read by the Court in Monsanto, not only removes and weakens
important safeguards, it demonstrates a judicial equation of the presumption of innocence
to the reasonable doubt standard.
D. The Presumption of Innocence and the Reasonable Doubt Standard
The CFA allows the Government to seize assets of an individual merely by
alleging that they would be forfeited if he were to be ultimately convicted. The Government does not even need to indict the individual before freezing his assets. The
Government's burden of proof is a civil burden. These pre-trial forfeiture provisions
necessarily presume that the defendant is guilty. Hence, it is necessary to discuss the
impact of the CFA on the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence is not
located in the United States Constitution. Coffin v. United States,2 °2 decided in 1894, is
the most recent Supreme Court case to discuss the meaning. of the presumption of innocence. The Court observed that the presumption "is stated as unquestioned in the textbooks, and has been referred to as a matter of course in the decisions of this court and
in the courts of the several States,"20 3 but it did not identify the source of the presumption.
"The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused
is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation
of the administration of our criminal law.""2o However, "te]xactly when this presumption

198 Hughes & O'Connell, supra note 191, at 614 (citing United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 962
(5th Cir. 1982) (Politz, J., dissenting)).
199 Id. at 619.
200 Id.
201

Id. (citing United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 (4th Cir. 1980)).

202 156 U.S. 432 (1894).
203 Id. at 454 (citations omitted) (holding that the presumption of innocence could not be adequately
conveyed by a reasonable doubt instruction). See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342 (1984).
204 Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453.
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was in precise words stated to be a part of the common law is involved in doubt. 2' °5
The Court observed that an article in the January 1851 edition of the North American
Review said that "no express mention of the presumption of innocence can be found in
the books of the common law earlier than the date of McNally's Evidence (1802).206
The Court responded that "[w]hether this statement is correct is a matter of no moment,
for there can be no doubt that, if the principle had not found formal expression in the
common law writers at an earlier date, yet the
practice which flowed from it has existed
20' 7
in the common law from the earliest time.
Indeed, the Court observed that "Greenleaf traces this presumption to
Deuteronomy, and quotes Mascardus De Probationibus to show that it was substantially
embodied in the laws of Sparta and Athens." 28 The Court commented that "[w]hether
Greenleaf is correct or not in this view, there can be no question that 2the Roman law was
pervaded with the results of this maxim of criminal administration. 1
Prior to the American Revolution, the presumption could be found in English law
in crude form. The Court credited a rough articulation of the doctrine to Lord Hale in
1678.21 ° In McKinley's Case,21' decided in 1817, Lord Gillies stated, "I-conceive that
this presumption is to be found
in every code of law which has reason and religion, and
212
humanity, for a foundation.
The presumption of innocence occurs in recognizable and codified form in Jewish
law. It traces its beginnings to a section of the Old Testament that contains a kind of code
for judges. In Exodus 21:1-23:9, judges are commanded to treat both sides to a dispute
equally. Later Jewish law echoed and defined that command,213 but also specified
further obligations.214 It required that criminal cases be decided by twenty-three judges
instead of the ordinary three judges.215 If the court was deadlocked on the question of
conviction, up to forty-eight judges could be added, and if that court were split thirty-six
to thirty-five in favor of conviction, the court was required to discuss the matter until one
of those who favored conviction agreed with the opposite side.216 Thus, if the accusing
party had argued his case in court and sat down, and the defendant had responded with
silence, it would have been possible for the defendant to be acquitted. In Jewish law, that
protection was intended to keep things equal between the accuser and the defendant and
to promote a merciful society that preferred to err on the side of acquitting the guilty
rather than punishing the innocent. 217 Those policies underlie the presumption of
innocence today.

205 Id. at 455.
206 Id.
207

Id.

208

Id. at 454 (citing GREENLEAF

209

Id.

210

"'In some cases presumptive evidence goes far to prove a person guilty, though there be no

ON EVIDENCE

at part 5, § 29).

express proof of the fact to be committed by him, but then it must be very warily pressed, for it is better
five guilty persons should escape unpunished than one innocent person should die.'' Id. at 456 (quoting 2
Hale P.C. 290 (1678)).
211 33 St. Tr. 275 (1817).
212 Id. at 506, quoted in Coffin, 156 U.S. at 456.
213

ABRAHAM COHEN, EVERYMAN's TALMUD, 309 (E.P. Dutton 1975).

214

Id. at 300.
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Id. at 302.
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Id. at 314.
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Id. at 306.
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The Court in Coffin noted the paucity of authority on the presumption of
innocence" 8 but indicated that "the presumption of innocence and the doctrine of
reasonable doubt are seemingly treated as synonymous. '"29 The issue in Coffin was the
validity of that treatment, and the majority distinguished the two concepts by saying that
the presumption of innocence was an evidentiary posture in favor of the accused, while
reasonable doubt was an effect of that evidentiary posture.22
That ruling is monumentally obtuse, because a criminal defendant would not be
able to predict from that holding that he could be detained prior to trial,22 ' or that his
assets could be frozen prior to indictment merely because the Government asserts that
they were illegally acquired and that he will conceal or dissipate them. However, Coffin
and the underlying natural law foundations speak only to events within the four walls of
the trial court. Outside the four walls of the trial court, all interactions between the
defendant and the state will be governed by other protections, and most often by a civil
standard of proof. From its embryonic form, the presumption of innocence was founded
on the belief that the accused begins at a disadvantage and that a civilized society must
be careful to punish only the guilty. Our tradition says that those values become
paramount during, and only during, the determination of guilt. Whatever else may be said
of it, the CFA is consistent with the presumption of innocence as a whole.
VII.

MODIFICATIONS TO THE

CFA

Congressional silence in the CFA has caused considerable perplexity in the
courts. This discussion suggests two modifications. To begin with, the CFA ought to
indicate unambiguously in the language of the statute that bona fide attorneys' fees do not
fall within its ambit. Next, the statute ought to formulate a standard to measure the
reasonableness of attorneys' fees. Fees that failed to meet such standards could be
forfeitable as sham transfers. Standards for attorneys' fees already exist elsewhere. For
example, 18 U.S.C. § 1988 permits payment of reasonable attorneys' fees by successful
plaintiffs to an 18 U.S.C. § 1983 action against state officials who violate an individual's
constitutional rights under color of law. The most common standard is the lodestar, which
is a reasonable hourly rate multiplied by reasonable hours spent. The standard should be
formulated with attention to the complexity of RICO and CCE defenses and with special
solicitude to the rights of criminal defendants.
VIII. CONCLUSION: NEVERTHELESS

IT

MOVES

The CFA was passed during a period of public and political scrutiny of the
increasing crime problems and of the decreasing resources available to enforce the drug
and racketeering laws. The Act was hastily drafted, and the legislative record is sparse.
Unfortunately, the sparsity of the legislative history produced a result inconsistent with
its stated purpose, with rules of statutory construction, and with the traditions of our
criminal justice system. "[A] construction of [the CFA was] fairly possible by which the
[constitutional] question may be avoided.2 22 The Court in Monsanto declined to adopt

218 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 457-58 (1894).
219 Id. at 458.
220 Id. at 460.
221 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1986).
222 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 643 (1989) (citing Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).

1992]

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

criminal justice system. "[A] construction of [the CFA was] fairly possible by which the
[constitutional] question may be avoided. 2 22 The Court in Monsanto declined to adopt
that construction. As the dissent observed in Caplin & Drysdale, "This Court
has the
' 223
power to declare the Act constitutional, but it cannot thereby make it wise.
Karin Graham Horwatt

222

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 643 (1989) (citing Crowell v.

Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
223 Id. at 656.

